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PLURALISM AND PROPERTY
Gregory S. Alexander*
INTRODUCTION
Welfarism is no longer the only game in the town of property theory. 1 In
the last several years a number of property scholars have begun developing
various versions of a general vision of property and ownership that,
although consistent with welfarism in some respects, purports to provide an
alternative to the still-dominant welfarist account. This alternative proceeds
under different labels, including “virtue theory” and “progressive,” but for
convenience purposes let us call them collectively “social obligation”
theories. For what they have in common is a desire to correct the common
but mistaken notion that ownership is solely about rights. These scholars
emphasize the social obligations that are inherent in ownership, and they
seek to develop a non-welfarist theory grounding those inherent social
obligations.

* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am deeply grateful to Josh Chafetz,
Hanoch Dagan, Nestor Davidson, Ori Herstein, Mitchell Lasser, Eduardo Peñalver, Emily
Sherwin, and Laura Underkuffler for help with this Article. I am also grateful to Nick
Sturgeon for very helpful conversations.
This Article was presented at the Social Function of Property: A Comparative
Perspective conference at Fordham University School of Law in May 2011, and at the
Progressive Property Workshop held at McGill University in May 2011. It was also
presented at a Summer Faculty Legal Theory Workshop at Cornell Law School in July 2011.
I am deeply grateful to all of the participants at those events for their comments and
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Not that it ever was. Welfarism, or, more simply, law and economics, has had at
least two other competitors in American property theory. Personhood theory, most
commonly associated with the well-known work of Margaret Jane Radin, see, e.g., Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982), whose views I discuss
in Part II.B.4, is an alternative to welfarism. However, for various reasons, not the least of
which was the fact that, unlike welfarism, the personhood theory is not and does not purport
to be a comprehensive theory of property, I do not consider the personhood theory to be a
true competitor with welfarism or social obligation theories. Both at a positive and
normative level, its force is limited. Its ambition is more limited than that of the social
obligation theories I examine in this Article.
The second alternative to welfarism in modern American property theory is
libertarianism. The most notable exemplar of a libertarian view of property is Richard
Epstein, whose work I briefly discuss in Part III.B. As others have noted, however,
Epstein’s libertarianism is leavened with a good measure of utilitarianism. Barbara Fried has
recently argued that the same is true of Robert Nozick, who is also commonly identified as
libertarian. See Barbara Fried, Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights? (Stanford
Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1782031, 2011)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782031.
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These social obligation theories have attracted no shortage of critics.2
No critic, however, has raised an ambiguity that characterizes most, if not
all, of the work in this vein. Although social obligation theorists have been
clear about their commitment to the idea that ownership imposes
affirmative as well as negative duties to other members of their
communities, they have not always been clear about the normative basis or
bases of those duties. More specifically, they have not always indicated
whether their theory is value monist or value pluralist; that is, whether it
rests on a commitment to a single overriding moral value or multiple moral
values. Of course, this is a fundamental question not only for social
obligation theorists but also all property scholars engaged in projects of
developing general normative theories of property, including welfare
theorists. 3 Whether they believe that a single value guides, and should
guide, all of property law or that no single view of the good either can or
should underlie all of property law’s contextual and doctrinal diversity,
property theorists must explicitly acknowledge and explain their position on
this basic question. 4
This Article has two objectives. The first is to clarify the positions on the
monism-pluralism question among social obligation property theorists.
Because so few theorists have explicitly confronted that question, I try to
tease out their positions from their normative work, recognizing full well
that this approach risks attributing views that the author does not hold at all.
My second objective is normative. I argue, albeit briefly, in favor of value
pluralism as the morally superior approach, one that is both analytically and
normatively more defensible.

2. See, e.g., Eric Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 889 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); Katrina M. Wyman,
Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 991 (2009).
3. Given their express commitment to maximizing social welfare, welfare theorists
would seem to be value monists. See Roger Crisp, Well-Being, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (rev. Dec. 9, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/wellbeing/. Although they may take cognizance of putative values, such as pleasure, friendship,
health, and so on, they treat these as only instrumental values rather than ends themselves.
Moreover, welfare theorists consider these instrumental values to be fully commensurable,
indeed reducible to a common metric. As I discuss in Part I, these are characteristics of
value monism.
4. Professor Hanoch Dagan has argued, correctly in my view, that property theorists
must also be clear about their position regarding monism or pluralism in a structural sense;
that is, whether property law facilitates diverse social and resource realms (say, à la Michael
Walzer, the domestic realm, the commercial realm, the realm of intellectual property, the
realm of residential rental property, and so on), each of which is governed by a different
value or balance within a set of values, or on the other hand, whether all of property law is
structured around a single core principle or right, such as the right to exclude. Although I
agree entirely with Professor Dagan in rejecting structural monism, my focus in this Article
is principally on value monism and pluralism. As Professor Dagan points out, structural
pluralism can rely on a pluralist theory of value. See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and
Perfectionism in Private Law, 10–11 (June 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868198.
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The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief explanation
of the terms monism and pluralism as they are used in modern value theory.
Part II sets forth a taxonomy of various social obligation property theorists’
views on the monist versus pluralist approach to values. Part III then takes
a normative turn, arguing in support of value pluralism generally and how
my social obligation theory specifically conforms to such an approach. It
also discusses the problem of incommensurability that arises under value
pluralism. I argue that the incommensurability of competing values does
not warrant the conclusion that no rational choice between them is possible.
Rational choice is possible, but this does not mean that only one rational
solution is always possible.
An unavoidable, and perhaps tragic,
consequence of pluralism is that in cases in which two or more
incommensurable values are involved, there will sometimes be situations in
which more than one rational choice is available. There is not always a
single correct answer. But that does not mean that no rational solution is
possible. Such is the human condition.
The value monism versus value pluralism problem is not unique to
property theory. This Article could have been written just as easily about
contract or tort theory as well as other topics of legal theory. Property
theory happens to be the domain that I know best. Scholars in other fields
may find this Article useful for their own purposes. If so, they may wish to
skip Part II, which deals specifically with property scholarship.
I. MONISM AND PLURALISM IN VALUE THEORY
Value monism and pluralism each come in several flavors, and, like
chocolate and mocha, the differences between and among them are subtle
and not always easy to discern. This makes the battle lines between
monism and pluralism somewhat murky. In this part, I provide a rough
sketch of the two positions and the main points of disagreement between
them, fully acknowledging that I have glossed over some important details.
At bottom, the debate between value monism and value pluralism is
about the structure of moral values. There are, of course, many moral
values at work in moral theory, but how do these different values relate to
each other? In ordinary conversation, we commonly speak of many values
that matter to us in our lives—love, friendship, happiness, freedom, and so
on—and we talk as though they are all different from each other. In value
theory terms, the question is whether all of these values can really be
reduced to one basic value or whether instead they in fact are distinct from
each other. 5 Monists hold that the former is correct, whereas pluralists take
the latter view. 6
The monist–pluralist dichotomy cuts across another set of distinctions
that is familiar in moral theory, the three basic approaches to normative
moral theory.
These approaches are, of course, consequentialism,
5. See Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July
29, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism/.
6. Id.
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deontology, and virtue ethics. 7 There is no necessary correlation between
any of these approaches and either of the ways of thinking about values, so
in theory a monist could be a consequentialist, deontologist, or virtue ethics
proponent. Similarly, a pluralist could subscribe to any one of the three
moral theories. No moral theory has its own unique or distinctive way of
looking at values. There are differences, however, in the ways in which
adherents of the three types of moral theory look at the nature of value
itself. Consequentialists look at value in terms of goods, such as
knowledge, beauty, health, and so on. 8 They see value as residing in such
goods. Consequentialists are not the only moral theorists to perceive values
in these terms; virtue ethicists hold this understanding of values as well.9
Deontologists, however, do not. Rather than translating values into goods,
their vocabulary is one of rules and principles. 10 They ask about a plurality
of principles, or a single overarching principle, rather than values or goods.
Regardless of their understanding of values, monists make the same basic
claim. There is, they claim, only one fundamental value, whether that value
is framed in terms of goods or principles. So, for example, Immanuel Kant
was a deontologist, and he was also a monist, for he argued that all moral
principles are based on a single, objective moral value, namely, humanity
(or human dignity), which he describes as having “absolute” and
“objective” worth as an end in itself.11 Similarly, utilitarians are monists,
although they take a consequentialist, rather than a deontological, metaethical position. Utilitarians usually insist that there is only one moral
value, variously termed as pleasure, happiness, social utility, or welfare.12
They recognize that other goods—such as friendship, honor, and
knowledge—exist, but they argue that all such goods are merely
instrumental goods insofar as they serve to achieve the same basic good.
Pluralists resist such reductionism. They hold that there may be multiple
values that are equally valid and equally fundamental and that these values
sometimes conflict with each other. 13 Moreover, as we shall later see,
pluralists often regard conflicting yet equally valid moral values to be
incommensurable in the sense that there is no possible hierarchical ordering
of them in terms of importance or weight.
Different forms, or levels, of pluralism must be distinguished from each
other. At the bottom level, in the sense of being most singular, is
7. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July
18, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ethics-virtue/.
8. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Feb.
9,
2006),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/
consequentialism/#WhaGooHedVsPluCon (citing GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA
ETHICA 83–85, 194 (1903)).
9. See Mason, supra note 5.
10. See Hursthouse, supra note 7.
11. IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in THE CAMBRIDGE
EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 78 [4:428–29]
(Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
12. MOORE, supra note 8, at 107; see also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 32–33 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
13. See Mason, supra note 5.
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foundational pluralism. This view holds that pluralism exists all the way
down to the most basic level so that there is no single value by which we
can judge the goodness of all other values.14 The best example of
conflicting views regarding foundational pluralism comes from articles by
G.E. Moore and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Moore argued that goodness is
unanalyzable. 15 He contends that when a person says that something is
“good” the meaning is not purely descriptive, such as the thing contributes
to happiness. 16 There is no getting beneath good; it is intrinsically basic.
Thomson replied that there is a basic plurality of ways of being good. If I
say that the movie was good, there are a number of different senses or ways
in which the movie could be good, and these different senses of the movie’s
goodness are sufficiently distinct from each other that they cannot all be
reduced to something that they all share in common. 17
At the next level up is normative pluralism, sometimes called preference
pluralism. This view rejects the claim that one moral value prevails over all
others (e.g., autonomy over equality).18 The normative pluralist denies that
there is any one unitary normative standpoint from which all possible
different moral values, which one might think of as “good-transmitters,”
might themselves be evaluated. There is a plurality of good-transmitters, or
value-bearers, but only one foundational good that they all bear. 19 Thus,
one may think that aggregate well-being is the foundational intrinsic good
but also believe that there are many bearers of well-being.
The final rung in the ladder of value pluralism is decision proceduralism.
This view distinguishes between criteria of right action and decision
According to this view, which is held mainly by
procedures. 20
consequentialists, criteria of right action, like utility, are not intended to
serve as decision procedures. 21 Rather, they claim that utility or other such
consequentialist end is only a standard of what is morally right. An agent
need not be able to calculate in advance whether all of the conditions
necessary for the right action have been met. One could be a value monist
in every other way but with respect to decisional procedures, choosing
whichever one is most advantageous. This is thus the least demanding form
of pluralism.
Finally, it is important that we be clear about distinguishing between a
term that applies to a group of values and a term meant to suggest only one
unitary value. The former meaning is consistent with pluralism, whereas
14. See id. § 1.1.
15. See MOORE, supra note 8, at 6–16.
16. Id.
17. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right and the Good, 94 J. PHIL. 273, 275–76 (1997).
18. See Mason, supra note 5, § 1.1.
19. This does not preclude the possibility that goodness itself might be foundational, or a
priori, meaning that a moral theorist could combine foundational pluralism with normative
pluralism. Such was the case with G.E. Moore. Moore thought that although bearers of
value possessed the same foundational value, they were plural with respect to the amount of
that good. See id.
20. See id.
21. See R. Eugene Bales, Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics
or Decision-Making Procedures?, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 257, 261–63 (1971).
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the latter is consistent only with monism. This ambiguity is particularly
relevant to property theorists today because welfarists have not been clear
in which sense they use the term “welfare.” Is welfare a term that covers a
number of different values which in these theorists’ view cannot be ordered
(meaning that welfare theorists are pluralists)? Or do they regard welfare as
a single unitary value, in which case they are monists? 22 If the latter, then
they are likely to face considerable difficulty when it comes to justifying
their view that welfare is a unitary value. This is because most (perhaps all)
modern welfare theorists are empiricists, for whom an account of any value,
including welfare, must be empirical in the sense of referring to phenomena
in the natural world. 23 So for them, an account of welfare that tries to
establish welfare as a unitary value, as opposed to a group of values, must
draw on phenomena in the natural world rather than relying on an a priori
account of what it is. Because, as consequentialists, they understand values,
including welfare, in terms of goods, they must provide evidence from the
empirical world to establish that welfare is a singular good rather than an
agglomeration of multiple goods. That may prove very difficult to do. It
seems unlikely that there is just one experience, condition, or state of affairs
that we call welfare. The term is just too broad to be captured by “one
singular sensation,” to borrow a phrase. 24 Upon closer inspection, welfare
may well turn out to be a cover term for multiple values, in which case
welfare theorists will turn out to be pluralists rather than the monists they
are commonly supposed to be.
II. A TAXONOMY OF SOCIAL OBLIGATION THEORISTS
With this overview, we can now consider whether the various versions of
social obligation property theory appear to adopt a monist or pluralist stance
on the question of values and, if pluralist, what form or level of pluralism
they take. This will be a representative sampling rather than an exhaustive
survey of social obligation theorists. I cannot possibly claim to identify all
property theorists who might reasonably be classified under the social
obligation label, so I leave it to them to do so themselves.
A. What Constitutes a Social Obligation Theorist?
Professor M.C. Mirow has expressed the basic idea of the social
obligation, or social function, norm in the following terms: “‘[P]roperty

22. One view is that welfarists are foundational monists and normative pluralists by
virtue of their commitment to preference satisfaction. From this perspective, only one thing
bestows value (that the agent prefers something) but many values (whatever the agent
prefers). On another view, welfarists are foundational monists because there is only one
irreducible good (welfare); all other goods are merely instrumental and therefore not really
independently goods at all.
23. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).
24. EDWARD KLEBAN, One, on A CHORUS LINE (SONY MUSIC ENTM’T 1975).
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rights should have their share of social responsibility.’” 25 The key point
about social obligation property theory is that it is a theory (or a congery of
theories) regarding the nature of the concept of ownership. Thus, it does
not include any and all theories that use the idea of “the social” to expand
the realm of the objects of ownership, including theories like Charles A.
Reich’s “New Property.” 26 Nor does it include every theory of ownership
that recognizes that property rights are not absolute. Such a criterion would
screen out practically no modern legal theory of ownership, including
libertarian and welfarist theories.
One criterion that might be used concerns a theorist’s position on the
As Jane Baron has pointed out, “Exclusion
right to exclude. 27
is . . . currently perceived as the central fault line in property law and
theory.” 28 Over the past several years, information-cost theorists, notably
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, have argued that the right to exclude is at
the core of ownership, perhaps even its sine qua non. 29 Social obligation
theorists, although by no means denying the importance of the right to
exclude, view ownership’s core as much more complex than the
information-cost theorists acknowledge. 30 Indeed, they resist the entire
imagery of core-and-periphery.
In large measure these opposing views about the right to exclude stem
from more basic views regarding the obligations of ownership.
Exclusionary theorists view the right to exclude capaciously because they
regard the obligations of ownership so minimally. Property owners are
rights-holders first and foremost; obligations are, with some few exceptions,
assigned to non-owners. Social obligation theorists do not reverse this
equation so much as they balance it. Of course property owners are rightsholders, but they are also duty-holders, and often more than minimally so.
Part and parcel with this emphasis on the obligations of ownership is
another characteristic of social obligation theory. These theorists repeatedly
stress social vision as the foundation of any property system. 31
Specifically, they argue that a main function of property is to structure
social relations and that a legal property system must therefore have a moral
vision of what type of social relationships it seeks to foster. Normatively,
they believe that a property system should seek to nurture social
25. M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others,
22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2010) (quoting UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY
LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 31 (2000)).
26. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Mirow,
supra note 25, at 218.
27. See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917,
919 (2010).
28. Id. at 919.
29. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
737–39 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV., 1849, 1857, 1861–62 (2007).
30. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1063 (2009).
31. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 757 (2009).
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relationships of equal respect and dignity, relationships of fairness and nondomination. For them, it is not enough that a property system is clear,
formal, and well structured. Those are important characteristics, to be sure,
but they are not enough in the eyes of social obligation theorists. To these
theorists, the evaluation of a property system must include a moral
dimension, and the morally optimal property system seeks more than formal
rules that delineate well-defined and transparent boundaries between
owners and non-owners. It cares about the character of the social
relationships that those rules and other legal norms help structure and
nurture.
B. Four Representative Social Obligation Theorists: Monist or Pluralist?
Taken together, the views of the four social obligation theorists I
consider in this section cover all of the main points made in the social
obligation literature. The choice of two of the four names—Joseph William
Singer and Jedediah Purdy—will be relatively uncontroversial. Jane Baron
included both of them in her study of progressive property theorists whose
views she contrasted with those of information-cost theorists. 32 The other
two require a bit of explanation. I include Hanoch Dagan for several
reasons. Not the least of these reasons is the fact that he considers himself a
social obligation theorist. His work has consistently and explicitly stressed
the social responsibility dimension of property, and his general property
theory, although departing in some respects from some social obligation
theorists, is still closely aligned with theirs. The final scholar in the group
is Margaret Jane Radin. The selection of Radin is probably the most
surprising among the four, but there are good reasons for counting her, at
least in her earlier incarnation33 as a social obligation theorist. Her
personhood theory of property had strong implications for the social
obligations of owners, and Radin herself developed some of these
implications in influential articles.34
In this part, I examine these four theorists’ views, focusing on the
question of whether they are value monists or value pluralists. In some
cases their positions on that question are quite clear. In others, they are not,
and I have done my best to distill from their work readings that are faithful
to the scholars’ views.

32. See Baron, supra note 27, at 924 n.12.
33. Since her well-known property work developing a personhood theory of property,
Radin has moved away from property to concentrate on intellectual property and contracts.
34. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND
JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXI, at 165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989);
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988).
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1. Hanoch Dagan
On the monism–pluralism question, Hanoch Dagan’s views are perhaps
the clearest of the four. Without doubt, Dagan is a value pluralist.35 He
says so explicitly himself, and his reasons for saying so are well grounded.
In a recent book 36 and several articles 37 he consistently and clearly argues
that property law reflects commitments to more than one value and that
these multiple values are irreducibly plural.
Consistent with his overall political commitment to liberalism, Dagan
argues that value pluralism can and should serve a freedom-enhancing
function. It can do so by “facilitat[ing], within limits, the coexistence of a
variety of social spheres that embody different modes of valuation.”38
Property law in fact does exactly that, he argues. In Dagan’s view, law’s
response to this multiplicity mirrors social understandings, especially
perceptions of what ownership involves. This observation leads Dagan to
develop a version of what he calls “structural pluralism.” 39 He summarizes
this theory in the following excerpt:
[P]roperty is an umbrella for a set of institutions [bearing a mutual family
resemblance], serving a pluralistic set of liberal values: autonomy, utility,
labor, personhood, community, and distributive justice. Property law, at
least at its best, tailors different configurations of entitlements to different
property institutions, with each such institution designed to match the
specific balance between property values best suited to its characteristic
social setting. 40

Structural pluralism has two dimensions, or axes. Dagan states that
“there are dramatic differences between meanings of ownership in different
social contexts and with respect to different resources.” 41 Certain values
can and should dominate certain areas of social activity and their attendant
legal institutions. So, Dagan suggests, negative liberty should ordinarily be
dominant with respect to those areas in which fee simple ownership of land
is involved (commercial real estate transactions would be a good
example). 42 In the sphere of marital life, however, values of community

35. Dagan is not clear whether in endorsing value pluralism, he means moral pluralism
or political pluralism. The term “value pluralism” is commonly used in connection with
both, but it is important to distinguish between them. Political pluralism, which is associated
with political liberalism, is concerned with the question of what sorts of restrictions the state
may legitimately impose upon the individual’s freedom, given the fundamental differences
among values that people reasonably hold. Perhaps the best known exemplar of political
pluralism was Isaiah Berlin, whose defenses of political liberalism and a strong version of
political pluralism were closely linked. See Mason, supra note 5, § 4.4. Political pluralism is
not the concern addressed in this Article.
36. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).
37. E.g., Dagan, supra note 4; Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J.
TORT L., no. 1, 2011, at 1.
38. DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72 (footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 4, at 10.
40. Id. at 4.
41. DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72.
42. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 3.
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and sharing, rather than personal liberty, should be paramount.43 In yet
other domains (Dagan gives the example of patents), utilitarian welfare
maximization is and should be the dominant value.44
The scheme of structural pluralism has a second axis, looking at the type
of asset involved as well as the sphere of social activity. 45 So, although
development of commercial real estate ordinarily should be governed by the
linked values of autonomy and liberty, residential real estate may be a
different matter. In common interest communities, for example, autonomy,
which lies at the heart of the right to exclude, gives way, at least to some
extent and for certain purposes, to values of cooperative behavior. In
residential tenancies and with respect to highly personal assets, the
impersonal values of the market should take a back seat to values of
personal identity.
Part of Dagan’s argument favoring pluralism as a normative concept is
that pluralism enhances individual freedom. 46 His argument closely
follows Joseph Raz’s theory of value pluralism. In Raz’s view, “[I]f
autonomy is an ideal then we are committed to such a view of morality:
valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism.” 47 Raz
argues that we exercise autonomy by making choices and that we can make
choices in a meaningful sense only if there are a variety of options from
which to choose. 48 Further, for the choices to be meaningful, the available
options must differ from each other, differ in ways that may affect rational
choice. Moreover, the options must be morally acceptable. “There are, in
other words,” Raz says, “more valuable options than can be chosen, and
they must be significantly different or else the requirements of variety
which is a precondition of the adequacy of options will not be met.”49 In
Raz’s view then, autonomy presupposes the existence of multiple
conflicting values and the necessity of choosing among them. 50 This is the
understanding of autonomy that underlies Dagan’s argument of value
pluralism. 51
Dagan only briefly discusses incommensurability of values and the
question of rational choice among incommensurable values. He accepts the
incommensurability of plural values, although it is not clear whether he
considers incommensurability an inherent byproduct of plurality, and
defines incommensurable values as “‘relevant goods [that] cannot be
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 26.
46. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72; Dagan, supra note 37, at 28.
47. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 399 (1986).
48. See id. at 398.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 11–12. It appears, although it is not clear, that Dagan
endorses normative rather than foundational pluralism, based on a commitment to individual
autonomy. See id. at 12. As Dagan observes, however, the difference between the two
versions of pluralism is not significant for his purposes because both versions impliedly
commit the law to the coexistence of a variety of multiple different value options. See id.
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judgments about how these goods are best characterized.’” 52 He follows
Elizabeth Anderson’s view regarding the possibility of rational choice
among incommensurable values, which we shall discuss in detail in Part III.
Briefly, however, Anderson argues that although there is no available
metric for making global overall comparative judgments of value, local
comparisons of value can be and are rationally made. These comparative
evaluations are what Anderson calls “goodness-of-a-kind” judgments. 53
Such judgments are impersonal choices made in the context of local
practices and rely solely on “values internal to and constitutive of the
practice,” 54 rather than external or global values. Anderson gives as
examples judgments about the performances of athletes (e.g., the scoring
system used in international gymnastics competition). 55 Such judgments
are not expressions of mere preferences or the results of personal standards,
nor do they consider values external to the object’s contribution to its
contextual practice. So, judgments about acting take into account
considerations such as subtlety of character portrayal but not how much the
actor is a box office draw. Choices among incommensurable goods can be
and are pragmatic and contextual, adapting to the conditions and standards
of the local practices involved in the immediate setting.
It is important to emphasize that Dagan’s primary concern is with a
certain form of pluralism—“structural pluralism”—in private law.56
Certain values and their attendant legal norms should, and to some extent,
Dagan believes, do dominate in certain realms of social life and those legal
institutions that facilitate or regulate activity within each of those realms but
not in others. Normatively, “law should facilitate (within limits) the coexistence of various social spheres embodying different modes of
valuation.” 57 Moreover, lawgivers should be obliged to create and facilitate
different—and sufficiently diverse—types of institutions, each
incorporating a different value or different balance of values. 58 One might
then call this form of pluralism applied pluralism, applying as it does
different elements of moral theory to the legal norms and institutions of
private law.
2. Joseph Singer
Although somewhat less explicit in his property scholarship about his
stance on the issue than Hanoch Dagan, it seems clear that Joseph Singer,
like Dagan, is a value pluralist.59 To demonstrate the inevitable role of

52. Id. at 11 n.36 (quoting Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994)).
53. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 49 (1993).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 13.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. In more recent general (i.e., not property-specific) writing, Singer, together with
Martha Minow, has unambiguously endorsed value pluralism. See Martha Minow & Joseph
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moral values in legal disputes and legal decision making, Singer has
consistently emphasized that property disputes seldom, if ever, can be
decided on the basis of legal concepts such as ownership alone. 60 Such
concepts, he has forcefully argued, have no single clear meaning that can be
used to settle disputes. Rather, underlying such concepts are internal
tensions which allow competing disputants to use the concepts for opposing
purposes. 61
Singer stresses the social dimension of property rights and property
norms. He states that “[j]udging whether a property right is justified
requires us to consider the ways in which the recognition of legal rights in
property structures social relations.” 62 This point is important for Singer’s
theory because Singer ultimately argues that in resolving value conflicts
that property disputes implicate courts must have some underlying social
vision. Courts must, that is, decide what type of society they wish to
promote. In structuring property rights, Singer contends, courts must
choose between alternative forms of social life. 63 These alternative types of
society range from one in which factory owners are free to spew pollutants
onto neighboring properties with impunity and a landowner is free to use
his land as a pig farm that emits obnoxious odors that make his neighbors
sick, to a society in which property owners owe obligations to non-owners
requiring owners, for example, to share their wealth to enable others to
become owners themselves. 64
Singer denies that property has any single, clear, fixed meaning. It has
multiple meanings because it derives its meaning from certain underlying
moral values. Singer states that property “is defined not by reference to a
fixed conception but by reference to human values.” 65 Moreover, like
Dagan, he states that the values underlying property rights and property law
are “various and incommensurable.” 66 A non-exclusive list of the moral
values that Singer associates with property includes the following: fairness,
economic efficiency, social welfare, and social justice.67 Moreover,
throughout his discussion of property, he identifies individual autonomy–
liberty, personal security, and human dignity as values that property rights
implicate. 68

William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90
B.U. L. REV. 903, 903 (2010).
60. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 25–28
(2000).
61. See id. at 19–55.
62. Id. at 14.
63. See id. at 18.
64. See id. at 17–18.
65. Id. at 37. Singer has frequently quoted this line from the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s opinion in State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971): “Property rights serve
human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.” See SINGER, supra
note 60, at 37; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD 1 (2000).
66. See SINGER, supra note 60, at 38.
67. See id. at 31.
68. See id. at 20, 31, 63, 68.
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Like Dagan, Singer sees a kind of order to the role that these values play
in property law. Unlike Dagan’s order, though, the order that Singer
identifies does not assign different values to different spheres of social life
or to different assets. Moreover, Singer, unlike Dagan, attaches no special
significance to property institutions as bearers of moral values. Rather,
Singer sees property values in paradoxical relationships. He emphasizes
what he calls the “[p]aradoxes of [p]roperty.” 69 So, to cite an example that
Singer uses, 70 suppose that X firm begins withdrawing water from natural
aquifers that lay under its land and that of its neighbors. It sells the water to
other firms which sell bottled water. As the demand for bottled water
increases, X substantially increases the amount of water it withdraws. X’s
neighboring property owners begin to complain because they depend on the
aquifer to support the surface of their land. They argue that if X keeps
withdrawing so much water, their homes will eventually collapse into the
earth. They contend that although it was generally legal for X to access
underground water from its land, X cannot exercise its right in a manner
that destroys its neighbors’ property. 71
Singer makes several points from this example. First, the conflict cannot
be resolved on the basis of an abstract commitment to strong property rights
or individual liberty, the moral value underlying strong legal rights in
property. 72 Credible arguments based on property rights (or liberty) alone
can be made in support of both sides. X can plausibly argue, of course, that
land owners should be free to use their land as they see fit and that this
property right includes the right to freely exploit natural resources that they
can access directly beneath their land. Their exercise of this right, they
continue, in no way encroaches upon any property right of their neighbors,
who are free to do the same. By the same token, the neighbors can argue
that X has unduly interfered with their property rights, causing direct and
serious physical injury to their land by removing the support for the land.
In this situation, then, an abstract commitment to strong property rights
supports both of two opposing values—freedom of use and security from
harm. 73
Second, Singer uses this example to argue that property conflicts often
cannot be resolved on the basis of fixed rules alone. Disputes such as the
example can be decided only through “the exercise of judgment and the
application of social norms.” 74 Singer accepts that courts may develop
general rules to adjudicate particular categories of cases. Even then,
however, values underlie such rules, so value choices must be made.
The third point Singer wishes to establish from this example is that not
only are values implicit in property concepts and norms, they are also
69. See id. at 19.
70. See id. at 19–39.
71. The example is drawn from Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest
Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21, 22–23 (Tex. 1978).
72. See SINGER, supra note 60, at 20–22.
73. See id. at 21.
74. Id. at 37.
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diverse and incommensurable.75 Singer asks, “How do we compare the
value of freedom and the value of security, and choose one over the
other?” 76 If such value choices seem impossible to make in the abstract,
they often are no more easily made in a contextual fashion. In the context
of disputes like that involving X firm’s claimed right to use underground
water, freedom and security support both sides’ positions. The same can be
said, Singer argues, from a welfarist perspective. Singer provides no
solution to this dilemma but simply wishes to point out to us that the
protection of property rights forces choices that are difficult, even painful.77
3. Jedediah Purdy
The first question to ask about Jedediah Purdy is whether he is a social
obligation theorist at all. I believe he is, although not nearly as obviously
so as either Hanoch Dagan or Joseph Singer. As Jane Baron observes,78
much of Purdy’s work reflects progressive themes, and at least one other
social obligation theorist has identified him as a fellow progressive.79 It is
easy to misunderstand the normative message of Purdy’s property work
because he labels his theory a “freedom-promoting approach.” 80 Moreover,
his recent book, The Meaning of Property, 81 explicitly draws its inspiration
from Adam Smith, leading one reviewer to characterize the book’s
argument as “a classic, liberal view of private property in which property
arises out of and helps foster a society in which individuals can enjoy
freedom and can flourish.” 82 The reviewer goes on to describe the book as
“situating [Purdy] in the category of those who largely endorse atomistic,
contractarian social views and who see individual freedom as the ‘single
master value.’” 83 I read Purdy differently in two respects. First, I do not
read his work, including The Meaning of Property, to endorse an
“atomistic, contractarian social view[].” Second, although he does state that
freedom is “a single master value,” 84 I interpret his approach to property as
pluralistic rather than as a commitment by him to value monism.
Purdy is no atomist. To the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes “the fact
that we need one another [and] are mostly powerless without one
75. See id. at 38.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 39.
78. See Baron, supra note 27, at 924 n.12.
79. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2009).
80. See Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005) [hereinafter Purdy, A FreedomPromoting Approach]; Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity
in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007) [hereinafter
Purdy, People as Resources].
81. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010).
82. Eric T. Freyfogle, Book Review, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 327, 327 (2011) (reviewing
PURDY, supra note 81).
83. Id.
84. PURDY, supra note 81, at 4.
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another.” 85 While he embraces positive liberty as a value, at the same time
he recognizes and endorses the negative version of liberty that is at the heart
of classical liberalism. The problem for property and society more broadly,
Purdy says, is how to somehow reconcile these two dimensions of freedom
in a non-coercive polity. In the two great metaphors of property theory, the
dilemma is how to reconcile the Aristotelian vision of humans as inherently
interdependent and social with the Lockean vision of the individual as
inherently self-sovereign. 86
Purdy reveals his commitment to pluralism as quickly as he embraces
freedom as a value. In the introduction to his book he writes, “Freedom is
itself a plural value, of course, and locating its plurality within property
thought is a major part of my aim.” 87 Can this statement be reconciled with
the statement immediately preceding it, in which he declares freedom a
“single master value”? The latter statement, of course, appears to commit
Purdy to value monism. But despite his confusing statement that freedom is
a single master value, Purdy in fact treats it as plural. He analyzes freedom
as multi-dimensional, with each dimension requiring normative pursuit of a
separate value. These values are: reciprocity, responsibility, and selfrealization.88 In the economic sphere, Purdy’s immediate concern,
reciprocity means that all participants have a range of alternatives, enabling
them to bargain with each other on equal terms. 89 Responsibility, Purdy
argues, requires that “the role of arbitrary fortune in producing inequality
(which implies nonreciprocity) should be as small as possible.” 90 In this
context Purdy means personal responsibility rather than social
responsibility, although he by no means sees the two as mutually exclusive.
Finally, self-realization requires full recognition of the human condition of
interdependence. 91 We need each other, Purdy observes, not merely to
survive but to prosper and, beyond that, to realize ourselves. 92
Purdy is a normative pluralist, but not a foundational pluralist. As a
foundational monist Purdy believes, or appears to believe, that there is one
property of goodness—individual freedom. As a normative pluralist,
however, he recognizes that there are multiple bearers of that value,93
including the three that we just considered.

85. Id. at 111.
86. Id. at 111–12.
87. Id. at 4.
88. See id. at 112.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 113.
92. See id.
93. I use the term “bearer of value” broadly here to include, for instance, institutions
(including legal institutions) and their effects on values like equality. The term also includes
objects that agents may potentially choose in the future (where to attend law school) and
situations over which agents have no control (a setting sun). Bearers of value such as these
are valuable because of the abstract value(s) they realize or display. See Nien-hê Hsieh,
Incommensurable Values, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 23, 2007),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-incommensurable/.
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It is clear from Purdy’s other writings that he recognizes other goods.
Indeed, reading his book together with his other legal scholarship, it is not
clear that he is a foundational monist at all. In a recent essay, for example,
Purdy expresses a commitment to interpersonal equality as a value that is
internal to ownership itself and that constrains the bounds of what owners
are free to own. 94 The same value—interpersonal equality—also underlies
constraints on the owner’s right to exclude, Purdy argues. Discussing the
famous case of State v. Shack, for example, Purdy suggests that “the most
illuminating way to understand this case is as part of a broader obligation,
instinct in ownership, to honor human equality.” 95 Purdy makes it clear,
though, that the conception of equality he has in mind is not one that
involves, at least not as a matter of logical entailment, a commitment to
distributive justice, but rather to access to markets.96 In this respect, then,
equality as a good is, in Purdy’s treatment, another aspect of the basic good
of individual freedom to which he committed himself in his book. Equality
as access to markets is part of what Purdy means by “recruitment” and
“reciprocity”—the processes through which individuals in market societies
participate in the multiple practices that constitute an economy—
employment, production, consumption, and so on. Within such a society,
Purdy tells us, freedom just means that individuals are enabled to
participate in these practices on roughly equal terms with all others.
Systems of subordination and repression have been wiped away, and
individuals participate in various market practices on equal footing—as free
and autonomous moral agents. 97
Purdy does not discuss the problems of incommensurability or rational
choice among incommensurable values. Of course, if he is indeed a
foundational monist, there is no reason for him to do so. The multiple
normative goods that he discusses—recruitment, reciprocity, selfrealization, and equality—are all aspects of the same master good,
individual freedom. So, there is no occasion for irreducible conflicts among
competing values in Purdy’s property theory, unlike the theories of both
Dagan and Singer.
4. Margaret Jane Radin
Initially, it may seem odd to classify Margaret Jane Radin as a social
obligation theorist at all. At first glance, her personhood theory does not
seem resonant of a social obligation norm. To the contrary, as critics have
noted, it seems individualistic, 98 at least as it was first set forth. 99 Its
94. See Jedediah Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 949, 950 (2009); see also Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 80.
95. Purdy, supra note 94, at 951.
96. See id. at 952.
97. See Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 80, at 1297 (advocating his
“freedom-promoting approach” to property, which “expand[s] people’s set of viable choices
and replace[s] relations of domination and subordination with reciprocity”).
98. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s
Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993). Radin herself
acknowledges that her personhood argument sometimes has an individualistic cast. See
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concern is with the role that property plays in the proper development of the
self rather than what obligations owners may owe to others by virtue of
their ownership. On one reading, the theory does not seem relational, and
in this respect it significantly departs from G.W.F. Hegel’s personality
theory, which provided the inspiration for Radin’s approach. Like Radin,
Hegel was concerned with the development of the personality, but unlike
Radin, the development of personality is a decidedly communal matter for
Hegel.
Radin’s later work reveals, however, that her personhood theory in fact
does have social obligation implications. Her theory recognizes that under
some circumstances some owners owe obligations to persons with whom
they have some special kind of relationship. In an article examining the
normative justifiability of residential rent control from a personhood
perspective, for example, Radin suggests that rent control may justifiably
lower some tenants’ rents at the landlords’ expense. 100 In effect this
amounts to recognition of an obligation that landlords owe to the tenants
with whom they already have a landlord-tenant relationship. This
obligation is based on what Radin calls “the intuitive appeal for preserving
the tenant’s [established] home.” 101 That “intuitive appeal” apparently is
based on Radin’s view that the resident tenant’s interest is one that is
“justifiably self-invested, so that [the tenant’s] individuality and selfhood
become intertwined with” her rental unit.102 The tenant’s landlord, Radin
implicitly suggests, owes the tenant an obligation to support this
personhood interest, even at the expense of sacrificing profits that the
landlord would otherwise gain by charging a market-clearing price.
Recognition of a social obligation of ownership can also be gleaned from
Radin’s discussion of land use restrictions. Radin points out that residential
communities, either through zoning measures or restrictive covenants, often
create their own social environments by excluding certain kinds of
people. 103 She argues that although one cannot judge in the abstract
whether such forms of community creation are good or bad, these
restrictions are bad “if those in the main stream of American culture and
economic life, who are not having difficulty living out their culture and
beliefs, create monolithic exclusions that make it impossible for minorities
and dissenters to form communities and live out their alternative
visions.” 104 “[T]here are moral limitations on servitudes,” Radin states.105
In effect, Radin recognizes that owners in these circumstances owe
obligations to persons who would otherwise be excluded by their
Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986), reprinted
in MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 72, 86 (1993).
99. See Radin, supra note 1.
100. RADIN, supra note 98, at 74–75.
101. Id. at 81.
102. Id.
103. See Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739,
757 (1986).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 758.
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community-creating restrictions to avoid actions that would undermine the
others’ opportunities to flourish and to experience a well-lived life.
Radin’s personhood theory appears to be monistic. It is true that she
does not present the personhood theory as a complete theory of property
and that she recognizes that other values, including efficiency and personal
autonomy, may have a legitimate role to play in some areas of property.
However, the same can be said for some welfare theorists, who state that
there may be room for values other than welfare-maximization to play, but
who do not employ them as part of their analysis. In one sense (a thin
sense), these theorists are pluralists, but they, like Radin, either pay lip
service to value pluralism or accept pluralism without facing the difficulties
pluralism entails. 106
The question is whether Radin uses personhood in the sense of a single
fundamental value or simply a name for a group of values, in which case
Radin’s theory would be pluralist in nature. Does she, in other words,
regard personhood as simple and unitary with no parts? Radin’s views on
personhood have shifted over time. In her article Market-Inalienability, she
identified three components of personhood: freedom, identity, and
contextuality. 107 However, she subsequently criticized her earlier analysis
as based too much on “past ideal theories about personhood.”108 In its
place she advocated a pragmatic, non-ideal theory of personhood, one that
is rooted in “the realities of needs, capacities and circumstances that shape
personal development in practice, in the world.”109 Her exemplar of such a
non-ideal theory is Martha Nussbaum’s “Aristotelian essentialism.” 110
Nussbaum, both alone and in collaboration with Amartya Sen, 111 has
developed a neo-Aristotelian theory of the good that is decidedly pluralist.
I have elsewhere explained Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capabilities approaches
to human flourishing, 112 but suffice it to say that both approaches reject the
monist view that there exists a singular unitary fundamental moral value.
Nussbaum analyzes human flourishing in terms of a list of specific
capabilities that she argues are necessary for a person to live a life
characterized by human dignity. 113 Moreover, her list of capabilities is
provisional and open-ended, adding to its pluralist character. In her later

106. It is true that Radin characterizes her view of property alternatively as “evolutionary
pluralism” and “pragmatic pluralism.” See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1904 n.208 (1987). However, there is nothing pluralistic about the
personhood theory itself. That theory focuses on only one moral value—personhood, or
self-constitution. Thus, what is perhaps her most famous and influential piece, Property and
Personhood, consistently and exclusively focuses on personhood. For this reason, I treat her
as a monist.
107. Id. at 1904.
108. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 425 (1995).
109. Id.
110. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of
Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).
111. See, e.g., THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 12.
112. See Alexander, supra note 31, at 762–68.
113. See Nussbaum, supra note 110, at 222.
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work Radin expressly endorses this list, 114 thereby implying that her
understanding of human flourishing, like Nussbaum’s, is pluralist.115 She
characterizes her theory of the good as “complex and detailed.”116 Further,
she states that it is, again like Nussbaum’s, open-ended and provisional.117
Finally, although non-relative, the theory of the good is culturally situated.
Radin states that Nussbaum’s “theory of the good implies a commitment
to [value-]incommensurability.” 118 Radin herself unambiguously denies
that all values are commensurable and further states that this denial is
central to human personhood. 119 The question of incommensurability is,
she states, directly linked with the issue of commodification:
“Commodification . . . implies
a
strong
form
of
value
commensurability.” 120 She has little to say about how to deal with the
problem of value incommensurability and apparently considers the greater
problem to be the refusal to acknowledge that values may sometimes be
incommensurable.
As to the latter, she states that “by and
large . . . philosophical argument, such as it is, cannot force those who are
committed to commensurability to change their minds.” 121 She continues,
“There aren’t any knock-down logical arguments that compel people to
recognize incommensurability.” 122 She does not seem much interested in
the question and so does not pursue the matter.
III. PLURALISM, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND RATIONAL CHOICE
A. Weaknesses of Value Monism: Rational Preference Theory
as an Example
A main, perhaps the main, objection to value monism is that it is
implausibly reductive. Monists attempt to reduce all moral goods to some
single irreducible evaluative standpoint, such as pleasure or desire. This
attempt simply does not square with our everyday experiences. As
Elizabeth Anderson states, “Our evaluative experiences, and the judgments
based on them, are deeply pluralistic.” 123
How do we respond to situations in which we are faced with multiple,
competing goods, like equality and autonomy? Utilitarians and welfarists
114. See Radin, supra note 108, at 437.
115. It further implies that her approach has shifted from one inspired by Hegel, as she
claimed in Property and Personhood, to one that is neo-Aristotelian, but she does not clarify
this shift.
116. Radin, supra note 108, at 437.
117. Id. at 438–39.
118. Id. at 445.
119. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 9 (1996).
120. Id.
121. Id. (footnote omitted).
122. Id. This—whether there are “knock-down logical arguments that compel people to
recognize” the validity of one’s claim—is an odd standard by which to determine whether a
philosophical issue is worth engaging at all. It is a standard that seems incompatible with
Radin’s commitment to philosophical pragmatism, which rejects demands for all
foundational tests for validity.
123. ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 1.
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respond by weighing the competing goods against each other. In doing so,
they assume that the nature of the difference between the competing goods
is simply quantitative and that, this being so, the rational solution to such
dilemmas is to subject them to weighing by a common scale or metric,
which, they assume, is readily available. This is a strategy of monism, and
it is deeply flawed.
Many defenses of moral pluralism have been offered, most of them
basically arguing that there is an irreducible heterogeneity of goods (e.g.,
knowledge, love, integrity, personal autonomy, etc.). I find particularly
attractive Elizabeth Anderson’s argument, which points out that there exists
what I will call a pluralism of pluralisms, 124 and I shall rely substantially on
her theory, along with Charles Taylor’s.
The common denominator of all versions of value pluralism is their claim
that apparently different moral values really are different from each other
and irreducibly so. But values can differ from each other in more than one
respect. What is attractive about Anderson’s defense of pluralism is that it
takes seriously everyday experiences, specifically, attitudes along with
practices that reflect values. By examining such attitudes and practices we
can recognize the multiplicity of differences among differences in moral
values. Much in the way that ordinary language philosophy successfully
draws conceptual insights from everyday expressive practices, ordinary
attitudes and practices regarding moral values are a useful and reliable
source of knowledge concerning moral questions. 125
Looking to the evaluative attitudes and practices of everyday life, we can
see how the differentiation of goods proceeds along multiple vectors. One
vector concerns the modes of valuation. 126 Anderson points out that we
employ distinctive evaluative attitudes toward different goods. 127 This is
saying more than that different kinds of goods are different in different
ways. It is saying that in our everyday practices we use different kinds of
standards to evaluate different kinds of goods. When I say, “Nelson
Mandela is a good man,” I don’t mean “good” in the same sense as when I
say, “This cake is good.” The standards I use in valuing Nelson Mandela
and cake are quite distinct and resist reduction to any single or unitary
standard. We have, in other words, a plurality of evaluative attitudes and
standards in addition to a plurality of goods.
But in valuing something—persons, objects, whatever—that is, judging it
to be good, we do not always employ standards. Sometimes we value
people or things intrinsically, that is, simply for who or what they are.128
124. See id. at 14.
125. This approach, relying as it does on everyday attitudes and practices, is not an
intuitive approach. It differs from an intuitive approach in at least two respects: first, an
intuitive approach does not identify the source of our intuitions; second, this method is more
social than the intuitional method insofar as it concerns societal rather than individual
attitudes and practices.
126. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 8–11.
127. See id. at 8–16.
128. Goods may be valued either intrinsically, i.e., for who or what they are, or
instrumentally, i.e., for what they can obtain or lead to.
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Most parents value their children this way. This is partly what it means to
say that we love our children unconditionally. But at other times we value
things or persons because they meet a certain preexisting standard that we
have. I value my favorite bakery’s cake because it meets a certain standard
of taste that I use in judging cakes, not because I value cakes intrinsically.
These two different ways of valuing things leads Anderson to observe
that there are two conceptions of good. Although these two conceptions
overlap with each other, they do not coincide perfectly. The broader sense
is captured when we say that something is good simply when it is
appropriately valued.129 The second, narrower conception of good means
that a person or thing is good because it merits being valued by virtue of
meeting certain preexisting standards of value that we have. 130
As Anderson explains, these two different conceptions of good lead to
two different conceptions of a plurality of goods. One conception is the
idea that we value goods in different ways, ways that are irreducibly
The second form of pluralism concerns evaluative
different. 131
standards. 132 There exists an irreducible plurality of evaluative standards
according to which we judge whether something is good or not. The
standard(s) I use in judging whether or not a cake is good are irreducibly
different than the evaluative norms that lead me to declare a Mahler
symphony good.
Another vector of differentiation concerns the social dimension of
valuation. 133 As Anderson notes, “[I]ndividuals are not self-sufficient in
their capacity to value things in different ways.” 134 The different ways in
which we value things emerge from social settings which sustain the
different modes of valuation. Anderson states, “To care about something in
a distinctive way, one must participate in a social practice of valuation
governed by norms for its sensible expression.” 135 For example, the
appropriate mode of expressing valuation of symphonic music in the United
States is applause, i.e., clapping one’s hands together, and this distinct
mode is learned in a social setting. The appropriate mode of expressing
valuation of an oral presentation of a scholarly paper at a university setting
in Germany is rapping one’s fingers or knuckles on the table, a different
mode that is also learned in a social setting.
A final vector of differentiation of goods involves the relationship
between goods and self-image. 136 Our self-perceptions, of what kind of
persons we are and what we would like to be, inform our perceptions of
values. My desire to be an excellent scholar implicitly means that I value
certain goods, goods which I strive to attain—to be clear, insightful, careful,
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 2.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 4–5.
See id.
See id. at 11–16.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
See id. at 5–8.
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and honest in my work. It means, moreover, that I have become
acculturated in the norms of a particular community that has educated me
about what goods are valued in the relevant social group of scholars of
which I am a member.
Monism attempts to bypass these several levels of differences among
goods by reducing them all to one fundamental value. This attempt ignores
the evaluative attitudes and practices of everyday life, which inform us that
we use multiple and fundamentally diverse standards when coming to value
the variety of goods that we encounter in the diverse realms of our lives. It
also denies the dependency of our evaluative standards on the particularity
and diversity of social settings in which we deploy those standards. It
implausibly supposes that one unitary fundamental value cuts across all
social and cultural contexts.
As Anderson suggests, one way to test monist theories against pluralist
theories is through ordinary experience. 137 Can the monist theory in
question satisfactorily account for the entire range of ordinary evaluative
experience? This means whether the theory can account for the variety of
standards we ordinarily deploy when valuing people, things, and so on, in
different spheres of social life. Can it account for all of the many goods,
and the many kinds of goods, as we experience them, that we value in
ordinary life? Elaborating on this last point, do those things that are valued
as good by the theory match up with just those things that our experience
gives us good reasons to value?
The version of monist value theory that is most common in property
scholarship (and perhaps most common generally) is rational desire (or
preference) theory, which lies at the heart of modern welfarism. Rational
desire theory asserts that what is good for a person, what that person values,
is what she or he rationally prefers. 138 Welfare economics, which posits a
cruder version of this theory, 139 consider such preferences to be the actual
preferences a person has as they are revealed through actual behavior. Let
us compare the more sophisticated rational desire understanding of the good
with the pluralist theory just described.
Although the pluralist theory and rational desire theory agree in
identifying the good with the subject of a person’s positive evaluations in
everyday life, they part company from that point on. The first point of
difference concerns rational desire theory’s identification of the good with
preferences. Rational desire theory does not account for all goods. It is not
so much wrong as it is incomplete.140 Objects of desire are aims that we
wish to bring about or to obtain. Not everything that people value is
137. See id. at 118–19.
138. See generally RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979).
139. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002). Whether objectionable actual preferences, say, racist preferences, should be ignored
or cleansed in the welfare calculus is a controversial topic among welfarists. Compare, e.g.,
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 20–24 (1983) (advocating elimination of improper preferences
from welfare calculation), with KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra, at 422 (arguing that purging any
preferences conflicts with individuals’ basic autonomy and freedom).
140. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 129–30.
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something that we wish to bring about. Indeed, some of the most valuable
goods to a person are not aims at all. A person values them intrinsically
rather than desiring them in some motivational sense. Think of one’s
children, for example. A theory of the good that defines the good
exclusively in terms of preferences or rational desires cannot capture most
people’s experience of valuing their children. Some additional value
besides preference-satisfaction, a value not reducible to preferencesatisfaction, must be at work to explain people’s positive evaluations of
their children.
The second respect in which value pluralism and rational desire theory
differ is the inverse of the first point of difference. The category of desired
or preferred objects is over-inclusive in the sense that not all preferences are
goods. This is so because of the logic of preference theory, which is
maximization of preference-satisfaction. If maximization of preferencesatisfaction is to serve as the sole basis of the good, then we must be able to
represent preferences in a “single, complete, transitive preference
ordering.” 141 If a person’s preferences can be represented, at least at times,
only by multiple conflicting preference orderings, then some value other
than preference satisfaction must be at work to determine which preferences
indicate value.142 In fact, preferences often do conflict. This occurs partly
because preferences arise from multiple and diverse sources, ranging from
rational evaluation to whim to habits and even compulsion. One possible
response to the problem of conflicting preferences is to identify the
strongest preference as the authoritative one, measuring strength on the
basis of either experienced intensity or motivational effectiveness. 143 But
this solution will not work. The problem with relying on felt intensity as
the benchmark of strength is that it is very misleading. Often the desires
that a person feels most intensely are compulsions or obsessions. If we
define rational desire on the basis of what states of affairs on reflection we
seek to secure for ourselves, then intensely felt desires will sometimes fail
to meet the test of a rational desire.
If we use motivational effectiveness as the yardstick by which to measure
intensity of desire, we encounter other problems. The motivational
effectiveness measure endorses whatever desire actually leads a person to
action, but such desires sometimes are the result of weakness of will. By
this standard, people who are addicted to nicotine and who are trying
unsuccessfully to quit have stronger preferences for cigarettes than they do
for good health. But surely that is a misleading conclusion to draw
regarding which preference is that person’s authoritative preference. When
preferences conflict, no intrinsic attribute of preference can tell us which
preference is the authoritative index of value. We must look to some source
outside of preference to determine that index.

141. Id. at 132.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 136.
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B. The Inadequacies of Value Monism of Property Theory
Value monism can be found in various forms throughout modern
property theory. Probably the best example is, as I have already indicated,
welfarism, the value theory that is the foundation of law and economics.
Because I have already discussed some of the problems that confront
welfarism and its theory of value, preference satisfaction, I will briefly
examine two other monist property theories in this section: libertarianism
and the neo-Hegelian personhood theory. Two problems appear in monist
property theories. First, they do not maintain their monist character. That
is, they both tend to slide into pluralism insofar as they introduce other
values. Second, the preferred value of monist property theories does not
account for all of property law but only for selected parts.
Consider first libertarianism. Perhaps the best known spokesperson
celebrating individual liberty as the single foundational value grounding all
of property law is Richard Epstein, and among his vast body of property
writings, the best exemplar of his libertarian view is his famous book
Takings. 144 Epstein’s book has attracted more than its share of critics, and
one of the common threads of criticism is that Epstein does not consistently
hew to his rights-based libertarian line. He blends libertarianism with more
than a few doses of welfarist consequentialism. Epstein claims, for
example, that his theory strictly protects property as a classically liberal
natural right. But in explaining the foundation of this natural right, Epstein
rejects the divine origin theory of Locke and Kant’s pure reason theory in
favor of utility maximization. 145 This move—attempting to marry
individual liberty as the fundamental value with utilitarian or welfarist
constraints—is characteristic of much of Epstein’s property scholarship.146
Epstein is not the only libertarian who fails to maintain a consistent
commitment to individual liberty as the sole foundational value that does or
ought to undergird all of property law. Barbara Fried has recently argued
that the same problem besets Robert Nozick’s theory of property. 147 Fried
contends that in Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick actually has three
theories, which she considers mutually exclusive—Lockean libertarian,
utilitarian, and “anything goes, provided that citizens have some
unspecified level of choice among legal regimes.” 148 To the extent that any
one of them predominates, Fried suggests, it is utilitarianism. 149 Indeed,
Fried goes on to suggest that most deontologists have not been able to
provide detailed solutions to everyday moral problems on the basis of their
144. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
145. See Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36
(1986); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 239, 242 (1986).
146. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents
in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986); Radin, supra
note 103.
147. See generally Fried, supra note 1.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Id.
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deontological premises alone; rather, they have usually relied on assistance
from welfarism. 150
Not only do monist property theories tend to fail in their commitment to a
single, unitary value as the foundation of property law, they also fail as
comprehensive theories of property. That is, they account only for limited
parts of property law, conceding (usually implicitly) that the remainder of
property law rests on other values. Radin’s personhood theory illustrates
this problem. This limitation of Radin’s personhood theory is indicated by
the very fact that Radin herself concedes that her neo-Hegelian theory is not
a general theory of property. 151 It applies only to those assets and those
forms of social life that are (or should be) beyond the reach of the market.
Even if we significantly reduce the market’s realm, removing from it a
number of assets or interests that may legally be the subject of market
exchanges under current law, we would still be left with an enormous area
of social life and an enormous part of property law about which Radin’s
personhood theory has nothing to say.
Both Epstein’s and Radin’s efforts tell us something important about the
moral foundation of property law. It is too heterogeneous to be reduced to a
single, all-encompassing moral value. Property law’s heterogeneity has at
least two dimensions. Radin’s dichotomy between “personal” property and
“fungible” property points to one dimension—the heterogeneity among
types of assets (especially viewed in context). 152 As Radin wonderfully
shows, although people experience many assets as market commodities,
viewing them for their capacity to create wealth, they experience other
types of assets in a fundamentally different way, reflecting a different
valuation. It is different not in the sense of being higher or lower but in the
sense of being an altogether different form or dimension of valuation. They
value these “personal” assets for their contribution to and relationship with
the construction of the owner’s identity.
A second dimension of heterogeneity is social context. Here, I have in
mind less the discrete realms of social activity (e.g., the family, the
workplace, politics, etc.) that Walzer famously described153 than I do the
myriad forms and means of social interaction. Epstein’s inability to
maintain a single-minded commitment to individual liberty illustrates, for
example, how the passage of time not only affects the relations between
past and present possessors of land but also implicates other goods—
including wealth-maximization, the self-identity that accompanies longterm possession, and so on—beyond individual liberty in disputes between
those possessors. 154 More broadly, recent judicial applications of the public
trust doctrine to contexts in which recreation is the use in question
illustrates how courts have recognized the importance of goods other than
150. Id. at 27–28.
151. See Radin, supra note 1, at 958, 991, 1013.
152. See id. at 960.
153. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
154. See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986).
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those expressed by the right to exclude. 155 These goods notably include
friendship, sociality, and tolerance.156 Goods such as these cannot be
reduced to mere preferences. They are not simply objects of desire, the
conditions of which can be specified in strictly non-evaluative terms,
something we either have or do not have (“I just do.”).157 Rather, as we
experience such goods, we recognize that in identifying them as valuable to
us, we must employ standards that are evaluative, even emotional in nature.
The need to use evaluative or emotional standards in identifying goods is
one basis for distinguishing mere preferences from pluralist goods.
Hanoch Dagan has pointed out that in property theory monism takes a
structural form as well as a value form. 158 By structural pluralism he means
the multiplicity of realms of social activity and corresponding legal
doctrines and institutions with attending value foundations. Thus, with
respect to the family home, in relations between the owner and outsiders the
right to exclude is indeed paramount and appropriately so. In this realm,
the law values individual autonomy and personal security. But in the
context of marriage and marital property, a very different set of values
prevails. Here, sharing, community, and cooperation are the values that are
normative guideposts for the law. Individual autonomy and security are
inappropriate as normative foundations for an intimate social relationship
like marriage. This institutional multiplicity can be seen in further detail as
we look at social organizations ranging from common interest communities
to partnerships.
What needs emphasis is the fact that beneath the structural multiplicity
lies value pluralism that is both foundational and normative. 159 The
existence of multiple social spheres each with attendant legal institutions
and doctrines expresses the pluralism of moral values. The various legal
institutions and norms embody the basic moral values that are at work in the
social spheres that the legal institutions regulate. That the law creates such
multiple and diverse institutions and norms is itself prima facie evidence
that the underlying values are genuinely diverse and plural. Moreover, even
within the same social sphere and same attendant legal institution or set of
institutions, there may well be multiple and diverse fundamental values that
conflict with each other or at least are potentially in tension with each other.
Some property institutions may express both individual autonomy and
cooperation or sharing, for example. In such situations we will need to
determine whether the fundamental values are incommensurable and if so,
whether a rational choice between them is possible. These questions are the
topics of the next two subsections.

155. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v.
Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
156. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779–80 (1986).
157. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 129.
158. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 3–4.
159. See id. at 10–13.
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C. Incommensurability–Incomparability
Value pluralism is often associated with the problem of
incommensurability. 160 Some theorists suppose that if values are plural
they must be incommensurate. 161 But we need to be clear about just what
we mean by incommensurate, for there is disagreement about its
meaning. 162 One meaning is that incommensurable objects cannot be
measured by a single common scalar metric. In this sense it does appear
that plural values involve incommensurability. But others use the term
“incommensurable” (or “incommensurate”) as being synonymous with
Strictly speaking, the two are not identical.164
incomparable. 163
Incommensurables can be comparable. The side and diagonal of a square
are incommensurable but comparable.165 However, even if plurality does
not entail incomparability, the plural (and incommensurate) moral values at
conflict in a given situation may still be regarded as incomparable, raising
the problem of whether rational choice between (or among) them is
possible. 166 This is the problem that critics of pluralism commonly raise,
and it is the one I wish to address. Hence, I will, following Joseph Raz,167
treat incommensurability as synonymous with incomparability, which I
think is the more serious problem.
Let us define two incommensurate goods as two goods about which no
positive value relation between them holds. A positive value relation
means that we can say that x is better than y, or x is less than y, or x is equal
to y. If we can say none of those things about the relation between x and y,
then they are incommensurate. 168 One can commensurate two or more
values only in relation to what Ruth Chang calls a “covering value,” i.e.,
some valuable respect or consideration that they share in common. 169 So,
two intrinsically valuable goods such as Bach’s musical genius and Mother
Theresa’s kindness are incommensurate because they are valuable in
fundamentally different respects. There is no covering value that enables
any statement of a positive value relation between them to be made. Where
160. For an argument that value pluralism does not necessarily involve incomparability
qua incommensurability, see Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 14–16 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
161. See Michael Stocker, Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and
Maximization, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 160, at 196, 203.
162. See Chang, supra note 160, at 1.
163. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 47, at 322.
164. Comparison does not require any single scalar metric of measurement. One
alternative can be better than another in a relevant sense (e.g., moral) without being a certain
number of units better. Items that are comparable can be ordinally ranked, i.e., ranked on a
list, but need not be cardinally ranked, i.e., precisely ranked on the basis of a certain number
of units of some scalar metric. See Chang, supra note 160, at 2.
165. Stocker, supra note 161, at 203.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
168. See Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 90,
90.
169. Chang, supra note 160, at 34.
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there is a covering value, Elizabeth Anderson has developed a three-part
test for incommensurability. Sharing a covering value, multiple goods are
still incommensurable, she suggests, if (1) they both meet the standards
measured by some scale but do so in very different ways; (2) there are no
great differences in the extent to which each good meets the standards in its
own way; and (3) meeting the standards in one way is not categorically
superior to the other way. 170 Consider genius. There are multiple ways of
meeting the standard of genius, but none of them is categorically superior to
the other. Bach’s musical genius is beyond question, but it is not
categorically superior to Shakespeare’s literary genius. Each exhibited
genius in the way appropriate to his own genre, which were quite different
from each other. Neither displayed greater genius than the other, nor can
we say that they were roughly the same in genius. But suppose that
Shakespeare had developed the novel as well as written plays and sonnets.
This imagined Shakespeare would be better than the real one, but would we
say that he exhibited greater genius than Bach? This would make no sense.
The situation exhibits what Raz calls intransitivity: Bach does not possess
more genius than does Shakespeare, nor does the opposite hold true. 171 But
there is a third option—the imagined Shakespeare—and this option is better
than one but not the other. Intransitivity is the mark, Raz says, of
incommensurability. 172
Just how common is the phenomenon of incommensurability of values?
It depends. Values are guides for decisions or reasons for action. In this
respect, values implicate the question of human agency. 173 There are,
broadly speaking, two schools of thought about human agency. The crucial
differences between the two are: first, the rationalist considers the agent’s
preferences as a reason for decision or action, whereas the classical school
regards preference as an independent factor rather than a reason; second, the
rationalist holds that incommensurabilities are relatively rare anomalies,
whereas classicists consider value incommensurabilities far more
common. 174
The rationalist’s move of regarding preferences as reasons is highly
problematic. Preferences are motivations, but they are not, at least not
necessarily, reasons. Reasons require both information and reflection,
qualities that preferences may or may not exhibit. My preference for
vanilla ice cream over chocolate is not the result of information (at least not
much) or reflection but instinctive reaction to taste. By considering
preferences as reasons, rationalists cover the universe of motivations,
thereby rendering the category of non-choice among incommensurate goods
an empty category. A nifty move, but unconvincing. Unconvincing and
unnecessary. There is another way to approach the problem of rational
170.
171.
172.
173.

ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 55.
See RAZ, supra note 47, at 325–26.
See id.
See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 110, 111.
174. Id.
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choice among incommensurate goods that does not require treating
preferences as reasons. I turn to that approach in the next section.
One more point about preferences needs to be added. Welfarists and
other consequentialists sometimes try to avoid the problem of
incommensurable goods by arguing that all preferences are complete, and
that being the case, any two available options to someone who faces a
choice between them are commensurable. The preferences are complete,
the argument goes, because in a given situation the chooser may always be
forced to choose, hence revealing her preference. 175 This argument
succeeds by reducing preferences to choices, but that is surely a mistake.
Choices are sometimes forced in situations in which it would be absurd to
call the chosen option a “preference.”176 Sometimes choices reflect
preferences, but at other times, choices are just choices. They certainly tell
us nothing about values. The fact that a person’s choices are complete is no
reliable indicator of the person’s value rankings. Hence, the preferencemaximizer cannot sidestep the problem of incommensurability.
D. Rational Choice Among Incommensurate Goods
Are we left, then, with no alternative but to conclude that values are
indeed irreducibly plural and thus that it is not (or at least may not be)
possible to make a rational choice between two moral values? Can we
make non-arbitrary (though contestable) decisions in such situations in the
absence of an available metric?
I think there is an alternative, and it is one that resonates with suggestions
that a number of other moral theorists have raised. To introduce it, let me
quote a passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which he discusses
epieikeia, or equity:
[A]ll law is universal [generally], but there are some things about which it
is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms. Now, in [those]
situations where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible
to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in
what respect it misses the mark. The law itself is none the less correct.
For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the
nature of the case. For such is the material of which actions are made. So
in a situation in which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue
happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the
shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver
due to the generality of his statement. . . . There are some things about
which it is impossible to enact a law, so that a special decree is required.
For where a thing is indefinite, the rule by which it is measured is also
indefinite, as is, for example, the leaden rule used in Lesbian construction

175. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 58.
176. The choice posed in the novel by William Styron, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979), is a
particularly vivid fictive example.
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work. Just as this rule is not rigid but shifts with the contour of the stone,
so a decree is adapted to a given situation. 177

As usual, Aristotle is highly instructive, not only about the problem of
rules and standards but more generally about making practical decisions
and the nature of the practical.178 In this passage, of course, Aristotle is
discussing practical reason, and practical reason is not solely concerned
with means but with ends as well. 179 Aristotle reminds us that in living
their lives individuals are able to deliberate about seemingly intractable
choices and to evaluate what ends are important to them and why. They do
not do so merely by relying on their personal preferences, which they treat
as some sort of unexamined black box. Rather, they look inside the box
and closely examine its contents. Nor do they do so by engaging in some
sort of maximizing calculation but by reflecting, oft times in a kind of semiconscious way, on what really matters in their lives, where “what matters”
pertains to considerations such as how they find personal fulfillment or
what provides meaning for their lives.
In referring to “what really matters,” I mean those actions, modes of
behavior, personal characteristics, virtues, ways of life that deeply and
honestly express and embody the kind of life that the individual regards as
satisfying, worthwhile, and fulfilling—in short, good. 180 What may really
matter to some people is kindness to others, best experienced by easing
their suffering or discomfort. For others, what really matters may be
something quite different—the esteem of one’s peers, perhaps, or
unshakeable courage, and so on. If those who consider kindness to be the
most important good in life, or at least among the most important goods,
reflect on what accounts for their valuation of kindness, they will come to a
deeper level of understanding of their moral constitution. They will realize
that the view they hold regarding kindness as fundamental to the good life
relates closely to certain background understandings they have, such as
basic views of the relationship between the individual and society, the
nature of humanity, and so on. 181 In deliberating about the seemingly
intractable choices between two or more irreducible but incommensurable
177. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V., ch. 10, at 1137b–1138a (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1962). The reference to Lesbian construction work is to its molding, which had an
undulating curve. The Lesbian rule was “a flexible piece of lead which was first
accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to
other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most
closely into those of the stone already laid.” 1 J.A. STEWART, NOTES ON THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 531 (1973).
178. The following discussion draws inspiration from essays by Charles Taylor and
David Wiggins. See Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 170; David Wiggins,
Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 52.
179. See David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S
ETHICS 221 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
180. Charles Taylor refers to such actions, ways of being, and so on, as “life goods.” See
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 93 (1989).
181. Taylor refers to these basic understandings as “constitutive good[s].” Id. at 92. They
are constitutive insofar as they constitute the life goods themselves. See id. at 92–95.
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options, individuals move, often (probably usually) unconsciously, between
these different levels of reflection about what really matters. In doing so,
they begin to break down what really matters, whatever it may be for them
individually, into more finely-grained essentials, elements, threads, and
dispositions.
What emerges from this process, although usually not in any clearly
articulated form, are evaluative criteria through which individuals are able
to avoid impasses in their reflections about what really is worthwhile in life.
They develop these criteria contextually, not in the abstract, in an all-thingsconsidered method where all the things that they consider are the concrete
elements immediately at hand. The criteria, then, may lack sufficient
generality to permit a general ordinal ranking, let alone a cardinal ranking,
yet the criteria are sufficiently definite and substantive to enable choices to
be made among available options. As the excerpt from Aristotle quoted
above indicates, this is what it means to be “practical” and to engage in
practical reasoning. It cannot be distilled into any process that we can
remotely characterize as maximization, for what really matters is not a
unitary super-value in the end. What really matters is complex, irreducibly
so, and part of the point of the process of reflecting on it is to come to grips
with its irreducible complexity.
As Aristotle emphasizes, the nature of practical reasoning is such that no
blanket general (or “universal,” to use the Aristotelian term) rule will be of
use in the kind of cases we are discussing. “There are some things about
which it is impossible to enact a law,” he urges us to acknowledge. 182 Our
decisions, our choices between multiple incommensurable goods, are
intensely and inevitably fact dependent. We ourselves don’t rely on general
rules that abstractly rank-order our values when confronted with such
dilemmas, for such rules would fail us in these cases. They would fail us
for exactly the reason Aristotle identifies—because “there are some things
about which it is not possible to speak in universal terms.” 183 In such cases
we cannot use a “rule [that] is . . . rigid but [rather one that] shifts with the
contour of the stone.” 184
To continue Aristotle’s metaphor, the stone is what really matters, and
the contour of that stone is not always clear. The process of reflecting on
what really matters may reveal that it is not morally unambiguous, and in
fact it is not even a single value when viewed in a particular context.
Suppose that Jill is a graduate botany student doing fieldwork on local flora
in Africa. She accidentally discovers that an indigenous flower, previously
known only to the indigenous tribe, has properties that allow it to be
developed into an anti-HIV vaccine. A significant portion of the local tribe
is infected with HIV or suffers from full-blown AIDS. She also learns that
the local tribe considers the flower to be sacred and uses it in one of its
most important religious rituals. Jill faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she

182. See Aristotle, supra note 177, at 1137b–1138a.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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could disclose (possibly for consideration, which she then might donate or
at least share with the local tribe) the existence of the flower to a
pharmaceutical firm already engaged in manufacturing anti-HIV vaccines,
or she could keep the flower’s existence a secret, thereby protecting the
sacred ritual of the indigenous tribe. Jill consults the elders of the tribe,
presenting them with the facts of her situation and asking for advice. What
course of action would be in the tribe’s best interest, she asks? The elders
conduct an informal plebiscite among the members of the tribe, who vote in
favor of negotiating with a pharmaceutical firm. But the elders reject the
results of the plebiscite and tell Jill that she should keep the flower’s
existence a secret. Jill worries about the fact that the elders have rejected
the apparent wishes of the tribe. She is also troubled by the possibility that
the elders, none of whom has AIDS or is infected with the HIV virus, have
not fully taken into account the interests of those who are suffering from
AIDS or are HIV-positive.
What should she do? Reflecting on her choice, Jill realizes that what she
values most highly in her life is being kind to others. Jill does not consider
herself to be any sort of saint, but she does share Aristotle’s view that
humans are social animals. Further, she believes that interdependency is an
inevitable aspect of the human condition. A little further reflection about
what exactly kindness to others means leads Jill to realize that what
kindness to others requires is not clear in this situation. She sees that it
implicates at least two quite different goods, both of which matter a great
deal to her. The first is respect for the tribe’s autonomy and their dignity, as
individuals and as a group. An important aspect of this good is nondomination—doing what she can to protect the tribe from being exposed to
forms of outside encroachment on their autonomy that risk domination and
loss of their way of life. At the same time, Jill is in a position to help the
tribe, to reduce their suffering, by giving the pharmaceutical firm access to
the flower so that it can produce the anti-HIV vaccine, which can then be
made available to members of the indigenous tribe, per Jill’s demand, either
free or heavily subsidized by Jill and the firm. Both options involve acts of
kindness to the tribe but in very different ways. Two different goods are at
stake here, and they are very hard, if not impossible, to compare. If asked
to rank-order them according to their importance to her in the abstract, she
could not possibly do so. How can she possibly choose in this situation?
Charles Taylor’s discussion of such situations is especially insightful.185
Taylor suggests that the crucial aspect of Jill’s reasoning will not be her
weighting of the different goods but will instead be what Taylor calls
“complementarity.” 186 Rather than balancing the different goods—
dignity–non-domination and improvement in health care—in the sense of
weighing them against each other, Jill will consider how both goods fit
together as pieces of a whole life that she is creating. 187 We are always in
the process of becoming a certain kind of human being, and we must
185. See Taylor, supra note 178, at 178–82.
186. See id. at 181.
187. Id. at 179.
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evaluate each choice that confronts us as a part of that ongoing process
rather than as an isolated decision. Precisely because our lives are an
ongoing process that is inconstant, unpredictable, and surprising, we would
perhaps not fit the same pieces together the same way at different points in
our lives. But at any given point in our lives, a point when we face the need
to choose between two fundamentally different goods, we do have some
sense of our lives, where we are leading our lives, and what kind of persons
we aim to become. It is that sense that enables us to see how the pieces fit
together and then to decide.
Complementarity reasoning in Jill’s case is agent-relative in nature. That
is, it moves away from asking what is the right choice in terms of the
competing values in general or in the abstract to asking what is the right
choice for the person making it (in this case, Jill). At the same time,
however, complementarity reasoning does not necessarily ignore the
interests that others may have in the agent’s choice. The agent’s own vision
of how she wishes her life to unfold and what kind of person she sees
herself as becoming may well lead her to take the interests of at least some
others into account. This is especially likely if she is responsible (and sees
herself as such) for the well-being of certain others, ranging from close
family members to individuals who are members of various communities or
groups that nurture her own well-being in some clear way. The range of
persons whose interests the agent takes into account may be broad or
narrow, depending upon a wide variety of factors. The important point is
that the agent-relative character of complementarity reasoning need not lead
to total exclusion of others’ interests.
There is no reason to suppose that when someone in Jill’s position is able
to make a rational choice between incommensurable values through
complementarity reasoning she implicitly relies upon some sort of supervalue that allows ranking of otherwise incommensurable values. That is not
the character of Jill’s reasoning when she considers how the multiple values
fit together. She does not view the values in binary, or zero sum terms, a
situation in which she chooses one and discards the other that has been
trumped. Rather, they constitute pieces of the ongoing jigsaw puzzle that is
her life—her self—and she values both pieces but must imagine how they
can fit with the rest of the puzzle. There is no rejection of values, no
trumping.
There is instead fitting and refitting until a sense of
complementarity—an understanding of the relative contributions the
various values make in creating the kind of person she wishes to become—
is achieved. Jill evaluates the contributions of each value by looking at
them in their relationships with the others, not in a sense of weighing them
against each other or ranking them (ordinally or cardinally), but in the sense
of investigating how each value fits with the others.
E. Complementarity Analysis Applied to Judicial Reasoning
Jill’s story is an example of practical reasoning in the context of personal
morality, but does it have any relevance to political morality and to legal
decision making? I think it does, and the key is Aristotle’s discussion of
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equity and its relationship to legal rules that I quoted earlier.188 In that
passage Aristotle intends to describe the equitable judge, but he also intends
to describe the lawful judge, the judge who realizes that legality means
supporting the legal framework as a whole. Acting equitably, Aristotle tells
us, is not acting outside of or against the law. Much to the contrary, equity
actually promotes the law by making it operate better. As a noted
Aristotelian scholar, paraphrasing Aristotle, puts it, “The legal system
works best when legislators know that defects in their products will not
necessarily result in injustice, because equitable [judges] will be on hand to
recognize the exceptions that were overlooked when the laws were
adopted.” 189 This is not a matter of rules versus standards or ad hoc
decision making, for Aristotle favors “universal law,” i.e., rules. Aristotle
recognizes, however, that rules, precisely because of their generality, will
be deficient because they are too general. Lawmakers cannot possibly
anticipate every conceivable circumstance, and even if they could, the rules
that would emerge would be needlessly complex. Hence, there are gaps,
some intended, some not. The role of equity, Aristotle argues, is to enable
legal decision makers to correct these deficiencies in legal rules, not as a
matter of refusing to enforce the law in order to do justice as they
personally see fit but as a matter of attempting to sustain the lawmakers’
overall vision of justice, according to the decision maker’s best
interpretation of that vision.
The judge’s role is to examine the vision animating the relevant legal
rule, identifying all of the moral values underlying the rule. When multiple
and incommensurate values are involved, the judge must engage in the kind
of practical reasoning I described earlier, what I called complementarity
analysis. But there is an important difference between complementarity
analysis in Jill’s case and as it is deployed in judicial analysis. I said earlier
that in Jill’s case complementarity analysis is agent-relative. Jill asks,
among the competing values, what is the right choice for her, in terms of
her personal vision of the kind of person she wishes to become, rather than
what is the right choice in the abstract. A judge has a different
responsibility than an individual like Jill. As Aristotle stresses, even when
doing equity, a judge must remain faithful to the law. Specifically, the
judge is obligated to develop the best interpretation of the lawmakers’
vision of justice animating the rule in question, to identify the vision of
what really matters from the lawmakers’ point of view, and then to see how
the competing and incommensurate moral values best fit together to
advance that vision. The reasoning is still agent-relative insofar as the
analyst is not asking what the right choice is in the abstract but with respect
to some agent. The relevant agent, however, is no longer the analyst.
Rather, it is a collective agent whose collective vision of what really matters
the judge must do her best to identify. The judge strives to develop an
objective understanding of the lawmakers’ vision, but the reasoning process
188. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
189. RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 110 (2002).
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is inevitably interpretive and contestable. In Aristotle’s metaphor, the
contour of the stone sometimes is not clear, and reasonable people may
reasonably discern its shape differently.
CONCLUSION
Connecting this rather abstract discussion back to property law and
theory, it is easy to see the attraction of monist theories such as
utilitarianism for property scholars (and judges). They hold out the promise
of providing a single correct solution to cases in which seemingly difficult
choices must be made by drawing upon the fundamental value at work in
their theory. But the promise is illusory. In property disputes, as elsewhere
in the law, the apparent value conflicts are real. As I have argued in this
Article, no fundamental value is available to mediate these conflicts. The
plurality of values that inhere in our legal property system—and other areas
of the law—is irreducible.
Where does this leave property theory, then? What implications does
value pluralism pose for property theorists? It requires them, first, to be
clear about whether they are pluralist. Too many analysts have left their
position on this important question murky. Second, those property theorists
who are pluralist need to attend to the vexing problem of whether rational
choices between incommensurable values is possible and, if so, exactly by
what reasoning process. Too often we property scholars—and legal
scholars generally—when confronted with the familiar dilemma of
competing values facilely state that a solution can be found only through a
balancing process. Analytically, however, what exactly does this balancing
process involve? Does it mean, for example, that we face a zero sum
situation in which we must choose one value and discard the other? I have
argued that this need not—and should not—be the case.
There is a final implication for property scholars who are pluralist. The
moral pluralist accepts the possibility that there are multiple ways to choose
well between or among competing incommensurable moral values. In the
context of both personal morality and law there are situations where more
than one right option is available, and it is rational to choose among these
options. This view puts pluralists at odds with monists, who consider it a
failure of pluralists that they cannot unequivocally endorse one uniquely
correct course of action. 190 But this is not a weakness of pluralism.
Buridan’s ass 191 can rationally choose one pile of oats over the other. The
190. Louis Kaplow, for example, makes this criticism of Amartya Sen’s capabilities
theory. See Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-Being?, 116 PHIL. REV.
603 (2007).
191. The allegory of Buridan’s ass illustrates the dilemma of the moral choice between
two apparently identical items. It was first developed by the French philosopher Jean
Buridan (1300–58), who actually discussed a dog rather than an ass in his commentary of
Aristotle’s De caelo. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, SCHOLASTIC MEDITATIONS 18–19 (2005)
(discussing Buridan’s unpublished Expositio textus of the De caelo). Buridan discusses the
method by which a dog must choose between two equal amounts of food (of the same kind)
placed before it. See id. Given a symmetry of information and symmetry of preference,
Buridan concludes, the dog must choose randomly.
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ass is not really choosing one pile over the other but rather choosing one of
them over starvation.

